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Abstract 
The analysis of favorable factors for establishment and maintenance of consociation democracy in Africa is 
important to assess the probability of success for consociation model in diverse societies. However, „these‟ 
factors have not been dealt with adequately in the previous studies on Africa. So, my work attempts firstly to 
discuss on the presence or absence of favorable conditions for consociationalism in Africa, secondly show a 
comparative analysis of favorable conditions in consociational democratization attempts, hindrances and 
prospects in Benin, Botswana and Kenya, thirdly contextualization explanations of forces leading to 
consociationalism either through structural or voluntaristic classification of selected consociational democratic 
cases, fourthly a review of impediments to and prospects for consociational democratization in Africa generally, 
and lastly a conclusion with a comparative way forward of the selected cases for consociational democratization 
in Africa at large.  
Keywords: Consociationalism; Democracy; Ethnic 
1. Introduction 
Consociationalism in democracy is an approach towards managing conflict in divided society democratically; it 
has a long history as a theory and a political practice, and has consequently evolved significantly over time in 
Africa in the dimensions of institutional design of power sharing for effective democratization. However they 
have remained theoretically underexplored in their connections both by supporters and critics of the 
consociational strategy of conflict management. Those critical of consociationalism as a whole often focus on its 
power-sharing dimension, while critics of territorial approaches to conflict management in divided societies 
normally ignore it altogether.  In Africa ethnic, conflicts and political violence are not a new phenomenon but 
the contemporary proliferation of conflicts in multi-ethnic states is such a vital development that requires a 
careful examination of the undemocratic practices that fail to respect the minorities as compared to 
consociational democratic practices. The political scientists and constitutional engineers have identified some 
connections between the political institutions and the proliferation of ethnic mobilization for participatory and 
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representative democratic leadership. According to author in [1], he advised that constitutional engineers in 
developing countries are necessary to adopt consociation devices to guarantee the political stability. 
Subsequently, Authors in [2] added that the consociation lists have recommended that Africa “will need to adopt 
and maintain consociation governance at federal centre” to “practice democracy. Furthermore Lijphart 
developed and advocated the consociation theory, and recognized certain favourable factors for consociation 
governance by ass  
1.1 Definition of terms 
Consociationalism; is often viewed as synonymous with power-sharing, although it is technically only one 
form of power-sharing [3]  
Democracy; is a government where the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised by them directly or 
indirectly through a system of representation usually involving periodically held free elections [4] 
Ethnic; Are those human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of 
similarities of physical type or of custom or both or because of memories of colonisation and migration, this 
belief must be important in group formation as argued by author in [4]   
2. Consociation Democracy in Africa; As a theoretical framework  
Consociation theory is an “empirically grounded normative theory that – through promoting power sharing of 
specific kind promises a democratic solution to societies confronted by durable ethnic division and political 
conflict”, as quoted from author in [5]. Consociationalism literally means “association between equals”. Despite 
having distinct cultures, institutions and identities, ethnic groups in consociations evolve a system in which they 
interact politically equal. They feel autonomous in their respective ethnic groups and have feelings that they are 
enjoying equal partnership in the system. They are politically organized, and a mechanism for their proportional 
representation is set-up. Author in [6] adds that; their elites that join together to form the national elite are 
intensively engaged in the politics of accommodation and bargaining.   
Author in [7] theoretically defined consociation democracy in terms of four characteristics: firstly as a grand 
coalition of the political leaders of all significant segments of the plural society; secondly as the mutual veto or 
‘concurrent majority’ rule as an additional protection of minority interests; thirdly as Proportionality as the 
principal standard of political representations, civil service appointments, and allocation of public funds; And 
lastly as a high degree of autonomy for each segment to run its own internal affairs. In addition to same author, 
he proceeded in [8] arguing that new consociation cases have been identified in Africa making consociation 
democracy moving away “from its empirical region of origin’’ of, Western Europe, from countries such as the 
Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, and Switzerland. As well as Beyond Europe, like in Lebanon, Malaysia, 
Suriname, Cyprus and India which were categorized as consociations at different times hence its development at 
the moment is evidenced to day in my selected cases of Benin, Kenya and Botswana as I will expound in my 
ascending sections of this work. 
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3. The Favourable Factors for Consociational Democracy in Africa 
The favourable factors for establishment and maintenance of consociation democracy are important to examine 
the relevancy of consociation democracy with certain cases. Although, these factors are ‘neither indispensable 
nor sufficient in and of themselves to account for the success of consociation democracy’, according to author in  
[9], they can improve the ‘explanatory and predictive power of the consociation model’. While, the 
consociational model is based on an “empirically grounded normative theory”, the favourable factors are not 
derived deductively but inductively after a comparative study of various consociational regimes over years.  
Hence, with the expansion of consociational universe, in Africa the favourable factors have undergone 
significant modifications in number and content over time to ensure equal power sharing, participation and 
general people’s ownership of the government (democratic practice) as discussed in subsequent sub topics. 
3.1 No Majority Segment 
The first favourable factor for the smoothly functioning of consociational democracy is that there should not be 
any group having a dominant majority in concerned society. According to cosociationalism as a theory, the 
presence of a majority group is an obstacle in smooth running of consociational governance as evidenced in 
African democracies with overwhelming majorities. Normally, the majority groups in multi-ethnic societies 
prefer majoritarian rather power sharing models. According to author in [10], he argues that the evidence 
showed that consociational experiences in Cypriot in 1963 and Ireland in 1972 remained ineffective due to the 
presence of substantial majorities, as the case was in Kenya with the kikuyu ethnic group during President 
Kenyattas leadership and kalengjine ethnic group during Danieal Arap Moi regime.  
In his conclusion he argued that the Greek Cypriots majority in Cypriot and the protestant majority in Ireland 
were responsible for the breakdown of consociational arrangements and as it transverse to African countries 
most evident today on religious front in Egypt Muslim brother hood segment and the westernised non-Muslim 
jihadist, this has continuously made the majority segments make consociational democracy challenged as well 
as encourage pluralistic oppressions promoting un democratic practices making conflict inevitable.    
It should be noted that segments of roughly equal size are more likely to cooperate during negotiations for the 
establishment and maintenance of consociational democracy. Conversely the uneven size of ethno-linguistic 
groups in Africa produce hurdles for the existence of consociationalism hence making favourable requirement 
for consociationalism to be missing. The African societies are unevenly divided among various ethno-linguistic 
groups, having dominant communities on one hand and a small minority of other. So this factor, also, suggests 
that the ethno-linguistic composition of Africa is not favourable for effective consociationalism, though 
successful trials have been made in Botswana in its incongruent bicameralism (Parliament), where it is very 
difficult for one party to gain a majority in both houses this has continuously proved to be a check to the 
majority regulation over the minority in the country. 
3.2 Small Number of Segments 
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It has been argued that the appropriate number of segments in a plural society is important for the establishment 
and maintenance of consociational democracy. A society that is composed of few segments has greater chances 
to practice consociational democracy successfully than a society having relatively greater number of segments 
as it is in Africa. Author in [11] argued that ‘cooperation among groups becomes more difficult as the number of 
those participating in negotiations increases’.  
For the case of Africa, balance of power between executive and legislative,  judicial review which allow 
minorities to go to the courts to seek redress against laws that they see as unjust to them as well as have a chance 
to enact or prevent legislation through the use of referendums to block legislation, all call for a consociation 
approach where there is a citizen's initiative as the case is in Botswana where citizens royalty, initiatives and 
voice is channelled through the blend of western and traditional leaders who serve and represent all sections of 
the country’s ethnic diversity and citizenry in the parliament level. 
3.3 Small Population Size 
As observed in the original cases of consociational democracy, namely the Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium 
and Austria having small population sizes. This evidence led author in [12], to argue that, the mode stand small 
size of population is a favourable condition for consociational democracy. He argued that‘ small size has both 
direct and indirect effects on the probability that consociational democracy would be established and successful: 
it directly enhances the spirit of cooperativeness and accommodation, and it indirectly increases the chances of 
consociational democracy by reducing the burdens of decision making thus rendering the country easier to 
govern’. Moreover, he maintained that “ in small countries like the Gambia, Rwanda, Burundi, Swaziland and 
Lesotho political leaders are more likely to know each other personally than in larger countries like Nigeria, 
south Africa, Mali, Algeria and Egypt, the decision making process is less complex, and such countries 
generally do not conduct a very active foreign policy”, as quoted for author in [13] . 
And due to the population size, this condition has differently facilitated power sharing process and ensures the 
successful operation of consociational democracy in Africa differently.  To make consociational democracy 
more applicable in some smaller countries in Africa, it should be noted that in some African parliaments, 
introduction of chambers representing regional interests, opposition and the other national interests, proportional 
representation, allows (small) minorities to gain representation too as evidenced in the new legislative structure 
of the lower senate and upper senate in Kenya with its regional parliaments and national parliaments 
respectively that both contribute to national policy formation. 
3.4 External Threats 
It has been argued that external threats to the survival of a state create cohesiveness in most nations in Africa. 
Consequently, this cohesiveness promotes the prospects for a successful consociational democracy. The 
evolution and development of consociational democracy in countries like Holland, Belgium, Austria and 
Switzerland during the First and Second World Wars seemed to suggest that the external threats in these 
countries strengthened the ties among the subcultures at mass level and the ties between leaders and followers as 
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the case was for south Africa, its diverse ethnic division with majority of Zulus united against the Dutch 
supremacy who practiced apartheid, it should be evidenced that all Africans united and supported African 
National Congress (ANC) up-to date. It should furthermore be noted that two segments are unfavourable for 
consociationalism, according to author in [14] because it would result into minority-majority split within 
subcultures despite the existence of these splits for south Africa some National unit of blacks has been evident 
since 1994.  
For the African case, I argued that ‘since the inception of consociational democracy, has been facing the 
challenge of national security and effective unity’. Traditionally, the threat to African’s security and to some 
extent unit has been external. However, today, it can be arguably asserted that “the major threat to national 
security in Nigeria emanates more from internal sources of the Buko Aram rather than it being directly 
external”. In review of this unfavourable factor towards consociational democracy, a neutral head of state, either 
a monarch with only ceremonial duties, or an indirectly elected president, who gives up their party affiliation, 
regional and ethnic belonging after their election would create a peaceful democratically consolidated Nigeria 
with less threats of Muslim jihadist from the north attacking the Christian Ibo and Yoruba in the struggle for 
representative leadership solutions or consociational democracy efficiency. 
3.5 Overarching Loyalties 
According to auther in [10], he argues that the presence of overarching loyalties is crucial for consociationalism 
as directly quoted bellow; 
“The divisive and cohesive forces cleavages and overarching loyalties may operate simultaneously, and the 
conflict potential of cleavages depends on the combined effect of the two forces, and an overarching loyalty may 
produce cohesion for the entire society or for particular segments”  
It has been argued that overarching loyalties are supportive ‘for consociationalism if the divisions among the 
segments are counterbalanced to some extent by an overarching sense of belonging together’ as quoted from 
author [13]. Nationalism and religion may prove potentially cohesive forces in contemporary Africa. However it 
should be noted that African nationalism based on cultural norms and traditional leaderships across Africa 
proved a unifying force after the partition during colonialism and struggle for independence.  
Nonetheless, the spirit of  ‘‘Ubuntu’’ is a potential binding force for majority of Africans that can greatly ensure 
organization and corporatist interest groups, which represent minorities in form of brotherhood and sisterhood as 
a one family of ‘‘we’’ African people. A rigid constitution, if this spirit of Ubuntu is well implemented then it 
would prevents government from changing the constitution without consent of minorities as well the people 
themselves will have the desire to participate in there governance due to the grounded loyalty from that ideology 
as well as act as a check to their governments for an improved conscociational democratic practice in Africa 
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3.6 Socio-economic Equality 
Socio-economic equality among individuals and groups has been considered essential for the establishment and 
maintenance of consociational democracy. According to author in [15], it is the second major factor for 
establishment and maintenance of consociational democracy. It has been argued that relatively deprived 
segments in a society may assert for “redistribution which constitutes the kind of zero-sum game that is severe 
challenge for elite cooperation” as quoted from author in [16] hence, the grave disparities among segments may 
endanger the viability of consociation.  
Although, socioeconomic differences within all the segments of African society as evident with the un equal 
distribution of minerals resources, human and technology development, some poorer segments have been easily 
be distinguished from the richer ones. Greater regional disparities in all the regional economic communities of 
Africa are no more conducive for the consociational governance in respective states however proportional 
employment in the public sector and equality between ministers in cabinet, the prime minister as the only 
primus inter pares with an independent central bank managed by experts and not politicians setting out monetary 
policies then despite the uneven distribution of the various resources, African state can achieve effective 
consociation democracy through having equal representation and participation of the majority and minority as 
well as the varying segments of the population as evidenced in Botswana  
3.7 Geographical Concentration of Segments 
Geographical concentration of segments is vital for the viability of consociational democracy. It has been argued 
that “the clear boundaries between the segments of a plural society have the advantage of limiting mutual 
contacts and consequently of limiting the chances of ever-present potential antagonisms to erupt into actual 
hostility” [10]. However as evidenced in Uganda with its decentralized system of government and Nigeria’s 
federal government, where (regional) minorities have considerable independence and some degree of 
consationalism is reached, the challenge that remain is how it could be made more effective and provide equal 
infrastructural development of regions which have been reject for many decades since independence in form of 
social economic, health other forms geared to equal regional balanced development in Africa 
3.8 Tradition of Compromise and Accommodation 
Traditions of compromise and accommodation foster consociationalism as argued by author in [17]. It has been 
asserted that “plural societies may enjoy stable democratic government if the political leaders are engage in 
coalescent rather than adversarial decision-making” as quoted from Author in [10] .  
In a situation where executive power is shared between multi parties, not concentrated in one, having many of 
these cabinets oversized by including parties not necessary for a parliamentary majority but equal representation 
of both minority and majority voices as evidence in the success story of Botswana where the chiefs of traditional 
leadership where integrated in the main stream government decision making process and law formations as well 
as dissemination of information to the citizens through them. 
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4. A comparative analysis of favourable conditions in consociational democratisation attempts, 
hindrances and prospects in Benin, Botswana and Kenya 
Experiences vary so widely in Africa that one can only speak of consociational democratisations as being the 
best approach for democratization in our pluralistic societies. Though most African countries were granted 
independence under a multiparty system, before long, military rule and one-party states typified African 
regimes. Some underwent crippling civil wars, from which a few are only beginning to emerge.  
After 1989, however, Africa witnessed a sudden resurgence of consociational democracy. My work in this 
chapter will analyses postcolonial democratic experiences in sub-Saharan Africa, concentrating on three 
carefully selected comparative analysis of consociational democracy approaches as implemented in Benin, 
Kenya and then Botswana as a reflection of sub-Saharan Africa consociationalism attempts success and 
challenges.  
4.1. Consociational democracy through the ‘National Conference’ Model, a leading African case of Benin 
Benin was not a good democratic prospect’, quoted from author in [17]. From the late 1950s to the early 1970s, 
successive governments experienced failure in ensuring social, economic and political stability in 12 years, 
which ended in 1972, when military officer Mathieu Kérékou seized power said author in [18]   
Nonetheless, its transition to consociational democracy, in particular its ‘national conference’ mechanism, 
served as a model for a number of other countries in Africa like Togo. Moreover, it is one of the few African 
countries to have an alternation of sharing power organised by Kérékou its president for the future course, 
bringing together representatives of all sectors of Beninese society, including ‘teachers, students, the military, 
government officials, religious authorities, nongovernmental organizations, more than 50 political parties, ex-
presidents, labor unions, business interests, farmers, and dozens of local development organizations’. In line 
with author in [19] that paper on Benin national conference as was edited by author in [20], she argued that this 
action ratified a new constitution and ensured equal distribution of power in Benin as a consociational 
democratic state.  
Benin can boast on its smooth transition to democracy and a subsequent alternation of presidents provided for 
and supported by the engineering of the constitutional that was consociational in nature as evidenced after the 
converging of the national conference however its democratic credentials are somewhat tarnished by electoral 
irregularities and serious corruption. Ethno regional divisions often threaten the institutionalisation of 
compromise and the recycling of erstwhile discredited leaders long left voters with few alternatives. Now since 
the power has peacefully passed to a new generation, Benin may once again prove to be a model for 
conscociational democracy through the National conference in Africa. 
4.2. Unenthusiastic consociational democracy transformation of Kenya 
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Contrary to Benin national conference that forced on all stake holders participation in the consociationalism 
democratization process of the national conference, in Kenya priority was given to elite appointed to political 
positions. For almost thirty years, from 1963 until 1991, Kenya was a prototypical one-party state. At 
independence time the leader Jomo Kenyatta, of Kenya African National Union (KANU), had absorbed the 
opposition. Neportic to his own Kikuyu ethnic group, and repeatedly amended constitution to centralise power 
hence being Authoritarian in nature, his successor, Daniel Arap Moi, assumed power after a bitter internal 
struggle and replaced influential Kikuyu with members of the Kalenjin (the ethnic group to which he belongs) 
and some allied ethnic groups. He also further concentrated power in the hands of the presidency, [21]  
Throughout the 1980s, a dramatic rise in autocratic rule and high-level corruption, combined with steady 
economic decline, fed internal discontent, as commented by author in [22] and this provoked civil societies 
ranging from churches, ethnic uprisings and most prominent among these pressure groups was FORD, the 
Forum for the Restoration of consociational Democracy, author in [23] in addition to Donor pressure which 
rapidly grew during this period. In late 1991, donors suspended all new aid to Kenya (except humanitarian 
assistance) until a number of reforms were adopted, including liberalizing the political arena. Forcing president 
at the time, Arap Moi to announce that Kenya would return to multipartyism through consociationally amended 
constitution by parliament by allowing opposition parties to function legally the executive branch remained 
quite powerful at the time. And in early 1990’s, the government agreed to share power through multi-party 
competition and co-opting transitions which enabled the country to hold three multiparty competitive elections 
but all in favour of KANU in 1992, 1997 and 2002.  
The first two times, President Moi was re-elected and KANU retained control of parliament in a process that fell 
short of international standards of ‘free and fair’, in large part due to a host of illegitimate strategies, including a 
skewed distribution of constituencies, irregularities in voter registries, partisan media and electoral commission, 
fraudulent vote counts and ethnic cleansing in key areas. The Benin approach has proven to be more 
consociational and representative of the various segments of its society than the one in Kenya whose elites 
politicise there mandates evidenced through ethnic and personality-based divisions within the opposition 
facilitating continuous KANU’s victory to date.  
It is unlikely that those in power would have allowed themselves to be removed through the ballot box in 
Kenya. In the 1992 and 1997 elections, donors had sufficient evidence of an uneven playing field and poll 
irregularities to contest the legitimacy of the outcomes. However, they chose not to, mainly out of concern for 
stability. In between elections, they virtually ignored issues of democratisation making the consocitional 
attempts to satisfy and co-opt the opposition to reduce loss of public support of the KANU party, as stated by 
author in [6]. This is a big challenge in that the voices of the minority are rejected and consociationalism 
democracy happen as a political strategy in support and continuous strengthening of the majority ruling party 
regime voice in Kenya 
4.3 Consociational democratic surprise of Botswana in Africa with its Authoritarian Roots:  
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In comparison to both Benin and Kenya’s approach of consociational democracy, the southern African country 
of Botswana is often cited as one of the continent’s ‘premier’ democracies. Author in [24] states that it one of 
the African country whose leaders have shared power and derived legitimacy from a political system that 
delicately balances modern statecraft born in the West with traditional authoritarian structures that predate the 
advent of colonialism with the primary architect of independence. Seretse Khama, Botswana’s first president set 
the precedent for managing the diamonds and copper-nickel matte wealth discovered in 1967, [25] , in a 
transparent and nationally advantageous manner, as was added by author in [25] .  
In addition to his approach of blending the western ideologies with traditional authoritarian style of governance 
gave rise to an appropriate power sharing strategy which had the support of the indigenous of the country in a 
way that the National Assembly, was made to be comprising of the House of Chiefs, a 15-member advisory 
body consisting of chiefs from the eight primary ethnic groups in the country, four elected sub-chiefs and three 
additional representatives chosen by the chiefs and sub-chiefs. This institutional sharing of power (consociation 
style) and somewhat symbolic recognition of the importance of traditional authority is supplemented at the local 
level by the oft-cited kgotla, or village council, system, sited from author in [26].  
In my argument given the degree of success of consociational democratic practice in Botswana, it has proven to 
be a better consociational attempt with prospects and manageable hindrances than that in Kenya and Benin 
currently in Africa, however the leading hindrance to effective consociational democratic practice in Botswana 
is that its ‘dominant political party’ has remained in power since independence, rendering parties such as the 
BNF and BCP as a permanent opposition.  
Despite the success illustrated above, given the absence of alternations of political leadership, Botswana as 
Africa’s ‘premier’ traditional consociation democracy has yet to demonstrate its ability to withstand the 
challenges of genuine political change of party leadership. The contradictory notions of democracy and the 
bottom-up assertion of popular will, countered by distinctly non-democratic tendencies of top-down traditional 
authority and single-party control of the government, have coexisted harmoniously since independence, but the 
potential remains for future leaders with explicit non-consociational democratic agendas to upset this balance to 
fully out compete all other forms of consociational democratization as discussed for the case of Kenya and 
Benin. 
5.  Structural verse the voluntaristic explanations, a classification of consociational democracy studied 
cases of Botswana, Benin and Kenya review and implementation 
Explanations informed by the impact of culture, history and economics are diverse and often result in different 
conclusions. Early advocates of the modernisation paradigm focused on the inability of ‘traditional’ societies to 
adapt to the social, economic and political demands of modernity as explained by the Botswana case that 
incorporated its traditional systems with the modern state to both operate concurrently addressing its structural 
impediments to incentives for democracy vis-à-vis voluntaristic explanation that emphasises the ability of select 
actors to affect change.  
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Author in [27] argues that, these agents include: rulers employing strategies designed to maintain the status quo 
or transform of the political system; grassroots civil society organisations mobilised to confront intransigent 
incumbent regimes, with a perfect evident of the  national conference of Benin that brought together 
representatives of all sectors of Beninese society, including ‘teachers, students, the military, government 
officials, religious authorities, nongovernmental organizations, more than 50 political parties, ex-presidents, 
labour unions, business interests, farmers, and dozens of local development organizations the country’s 
population.  
To a smaller extent, furthermore the voluntaristic explanation is evidently implemented by the temporal power 
sharing measures with a recall between political elites in Kenya during Kibaki’s leadership where Raila Odinga 
was his opposition but made his prime Minister in the same regime. 
6.  Impediments to and prospects for consociational Democratisation in Africa 
Until the early 1990s, consociation democratisation scholars and experts in African politics expected 
authoritarianism, one-party states and military rule to continue to dominate the African political landscape, as 
they had for decades. They were convinced that the continent lacked the structural prerequisites towards 
consociationalism associated with democracy as evidenced today and discussed below; 
 Africa is not characterised by advanced capitalism, has low literacy rates and has no civic culture to 
buttress democracy. It is true that impediments to democratisation in Africa are stronger than in any 
other region. The state and civil society, two critical actors in a democracy, both are currently weak. 
 In addition; African countries generally suffer from longstanding economic crises and extreme poverty, 
little experience with liberal democratic governance, and widespread societal alienation. 
 Another fundamental obstacle to democratisation throughout the continent is neo-patrimonial rule, 
described as ‘the core feature of politics in Africa’. Bratton’s original experiment of Neo-
patrimonialism is inimical to democratisation because the distribution of state resources is based on the 
ruling elite’s personal ties, rather than on principles such as the public good, national citizenship or 
equal opportunities. The ruler’s personal prerogatives also eclipse the role of formal institutions and the 
rule of law by depriving those they share with power to be rendered powerless and less influential in 
the affairs of the country as assumed to be taken by these several approaches in the three case studies 
expounded above. 
 Even if a full transition to consociational democracy does take place, the endurance of consociational 
democracy is an even more difficult challenge. For a number of historical and practical reasons, 
political identification in Africa tends to be organised along ethno-regional lines and political parties 
often compete to be able to bring benefits to their client networks. The ethnicization of politics, often 
reinforced by politicians themselves, promotes competition for access to resources, rather than the 
institutionalised compromise that theoretically characterises a consociaional democracy.  
It should there for be noted and understood that the impediments to democratisation are therefore significant, but 
certainly not insurmountable. Numerous transitions to sharing power democratically in several consociation 
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styles in Africa is evident and has occurred in Africa since 1989 as expounded in the Kenya, Benin and 
Botswana comparative analysis. Many non-selected countries of my work may have had different consociational 
styles or approaches that short-lived or only presented democratic façades, but in a number of cases, democracy 
has shown surprising endurance and resilience.  
Author in [38], argues that, though many countries’ trajectories are viewed as disappointing, failures can often 
lead to more imaginative and responsive systems of governance in order to answer the national question from 
the learning process of trails geared to reaching democratic consolidation through consociationlsim. Despite the 
paucity of consociational democratic success stories in Africa and the failure of this consociational democracy 
where successful in improve socio-economic conditions, Author in [29] asserts that liberal consociational 
democracy remains a widely shared popular aspiration across the continent of Africa to have a an effective 
government where the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised by them directly or indirectly 
through a system of representation usually involving periodically held free elections with transformed public 
service, social development and cultural protection of African people 
7. Conclusion 
The identification of favourable factors has improved the predictive power of consociational model to 
democracy in the African context. I therefore argue that the probability of the successful consociational 
democracy in a particular society in Africa can be assessed through the analysis of favourable factors in that 
society. 
Following this proposition, my work attempted to examine the relevancy of consociational democracy with the 
multi-ethnic societies of Africa for the case of Botswana and Kenya and civil society pluralistic makeup for 
Benin by analysing their respective favourable conditions and derived consociational democratic approach as 
witnessed in the differing consociational model as discussed in each case above. My evidence reveals that with 
some exceptions, these factors could be missing in the non- selected African countries due to the different 
histories, cultures and makeup of each though the favourable factors in my selected cases are quantified for a 
comparative judgement in the southern, western and eastern regions representation of Africa.  
The comparative analysis shows that the Kenya and Benin case is not coupled with a high success as compared 
to Botswana of the southern region of Africa at the moment. So, the evaluation of favourable factors in my work 
suggest that consociationalism putting in consideration of the traditional administrative systems with the blend 
of western systems of government would yield fantastic consociational democracies as a theoretical approach 
across all African countries with Botswana as the leading model (consociational democracy success) for all 
others on the continent. 
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